how the private sector has led the diffusion of information and communications technologies (ICT) in the US and how this role in Europe seems to have been mostly played by the public sector. This is to say that technology matters, but in this note we focus on the other fundamental element, namely institutions, and specifi cally on the many different (and mostly under-researched) ways integration has promoted institutional change in Europe. By better and more effective integration, we mean integration that is deep (in the parlance of economists) or genuine and fair (as per the Five Presidents' Report.)
This article presents three examples in an attempt to illustrate the reasons why we believe deep integration should be placed at the very centre of European growth policies. They are presented in chronological order and refl ect key moments in the European integration process, namely the EEC and EU enlargements of 1973, 1995 and 2004 . The fi rst of these, the 1973 enlargement, is an examination of the United Kingdom's experience in joining the European club in the fi rst place. It shows how the battle between integration modes or models was fought in the 1960s and how the debate between deep and shallow integration (that is, between the EU and EFTA, the European Free Trade Association) was won by the former.
The second example looks at the Norwegian experience of 1995, which generated a discontinuity that allows us to make a credible estimation of the causal productivity effects of deep integration. The contrast can be drawn between purely economic integration (membership in the European Economic Area) and joint economic and political integration (membership in the EU) by contrasting the experience of Norway with that of Finland, Sweden and Austria in the aftermath of the 1995 EU enlargement.
The third and last example discussed below is based on the experience of the Central and Eastern European countries that sought to become candidates to join the EU after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. It illustrates how deep integration, specifi cally progress towards EU membership since the 2004 enlargement, can engender institutional change. The Great Recession in Europe has coincided with a multitude of crises. Closing this diffi cult period will require policies that help revive and accelerate economic growth throughout the EU. This is a diffi cult period because the European integration project remains in poly-crisis mode: the fi nancial crisis, the debt crisis, the Greek crisis, the populism crisis, the productivity crisis, the terrorism crisis, the refugee crisis, the leadership crisis, the democratic defi cit crisis and, of course, the Brexit crisis. Although Brexit is one of many, it is unique.
Lessons from the
1 Brexit is a different type of crisis because it raises fundamental questions about the integration project. This was a one-way process toward a well-defi ned goal, but the UK vote for Brexit challenges the very notion of "ever closer union". Brexit is different because it asks questions about the value of being in the union, questions about the value of membership, about the value of being integrated and interconnected in the world, about the dynamics and distribution of the benefi ts and costs of trying to do so, and about the type of integration that can sustain (and hopefully increase) the substantial benefi ts we have seen since the start of the project in the 1950s. These are existential questions, and they must be answered if the EU is to endure after this crisis.
Whether Europe needs more or less integration is a much less consequential discussion than whether Europe needs better, more effective integration. Yet, future European growth policies cannot be based entirely on only one element. In an important contribution, Bartelsman et al. argue that one way to understand the productivity gap between Europe and the US is to concentrate on the interaction between technology and institutions.
2 Future growth policy will need to evaluate and redress the contrast between * This article summarises and refl ects my presentation at the Intereconomics 50th Anniversary Conference in Berlin. I would like to thank László Andor, Erik Berglof, Daniel Gros, Derek Kruse, Cian Mulligan, Brigitte Preissl, Debora Revoltella and seminar participants for comments and conversations that helped improve this note, but the responsibility for all remaining errors remains entirely mine. 1 R. B a l d w i n : Brexit Beckons, London 2016. 2 E.J. B a r t e l s m a n , P.A. G a u t i e r, J. d e W i n d : Employment protection, technology choice, and worker allocation, in: International Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 787-826. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-016-0633-8 Special Issue economic history scholarship is "British relative economic decline", 3 where economic historians offer a detailed understanding of key turning points in British economic history since the early 1800s. However, this long-term perspective fails to give WWII and European integration (including gains from liberalisation and increased competition) due credit. 4 An examination of European economic history provides valuable insights. The unprecedented destruction of WWII resulted in a similarly unprecedented recovery effort, which was largely completed by 1950. The following period, until 1973, was the golden age of European economic growth. Reconstruction and catch-up with pre-war levels were broadly completed by 1950, so other factors were at play, chiefl y structural change due to labour shifting out of agriculture towards manufacturing and, ultimately, services.
A requisite for Marshall Plan aid after WWII was economic coordination for recipient countries. It was clear at the outset that there were many areas of agreement but one of discord. The French favoured a customs union, the British a free trade area. The differences are substantial: customs unions entail deeper integration and require institutional change. Also worth noting is that "the United States supported the idea of a customs union in 1947, and continue to give backing to French schemes for West European regional organizations".
5
The UK decided not to participate in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was a result of the proposed Schuman Plan in 1950. The ECSC created a set of institutions to coordinate and integrate coal and steel production, including a High Authority to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement, an Assembly to hold the High Authority accountable, and a Court to adjudicate disputes. By 1950 per capita GDP in the UK was about 28% above the EU6 average. By the time the Treaty of Rome was signed by the EU6 in 1957, that fi gure was reduced to 15%.
In previous research I have argued that a fundamental yet relatively unappreciated feature of the relationship between the UK and the EU is the concept of a structural break. 6 The ratio per capita GDP in the UK compared to that of the EU founding members declined steadily from 1945 until 1972 but remained relatively stable between 1973 and 2010. Such a prominent structural break (and to the best of our knowledge one not previously detected and analysed) suggests substantial benefi ts from EU membership, especially considering that the UK joined too late, at a bad moment in time and at a larger cost. Figure 1 displays the ratios of total factor productivity (TFP) in the three countries that joined the EU in 1973 (UK, Denmark and Ireland) to TFP in the six founding members for the years 1950-2011. If one is searching for turning points, the contrast between the UK-to-EU6 ratio for per capita GDP and the ratio for TFP is extremely revealing. The structural breaks for TFP are much clearer than they are for per capita GDP. Although the turning point for productivity in Ireland is much later, those for both the UK and Denmark seem to have taken place when they joined the EEC in 1973.
The conventional view for the UK is that this turning point occured in the mid-1980s as a result of Margaret Thatcher's package of far-reaching structural reforms. The fact that Denmark shows structural breaks at a similar date already suggests that such an explanation has limits. Econometric evidence also does not support the structural break explanation. 7 An alternative hypothesis is thus suggested: this turning point actually occured in 1973 when the UK fi nally joined the European Union. Using the whole range of structural break tests, substantial econometric support for this turning point is found.
If membership has indeed made a substantial difference, the next logical question is how? To answer this, we discuss the key potential mechanisms through which these benefi ts took root. The chosen mode of integration (deep instead of shallow) may have played a key role. While international trade may have been the most important driver until the implementation of the Single Market in the early 1990s, foreign investment may have taken on this role since then.
8 Another contributing factor is that EU accession marked the victory of the business groups that wanted to compete at the high-tech end of the quality-demanding common European market against those business groups that wanted to compete in the comparative advantage-obsessed, price-driven Commonwealth market that mostly consisted of the UK's former colonies. These pro-Europe business groups later become the
